Several studies find that child labor incidence is higher in households with larger land holdings. 
I. Introduction
The main decision-making model about child labor (Basu & Van, 1998) formalizes an intuitive idea: The central driver of child labor is poverty inside the household. Parents do not make their children work if they can avoid it, and only when income is below a minimum threshold are children in the household forced to work. Evidence that supports this assumption is abundant (Ray, 2000; Basu & Tzannatos, 2003; Edmonds, 2005; Edmonds & Pavcnik, 2005) .
However, several studies in various developing countries (Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Dumas, 2007; Boutin, 2012; Gáfaro, Ibáñez & Zarruk, 2012) find that land-rich households are both more likely to have their children working and less likely to send them to school, and that average time spent in labor is increasing with land size. These findings challenge the presumption that child labor occurs almost exclusively in the poorest households, since land is strongly correlated to household income (Winters et. al., 2009 ).
This "wealth paradox" has been explained as the consequence of simultaneous imperfections in the land and labor markets: On the demand side, households who face a less than fully functioning labor market and thus have high transaction or monitoring costs when trying to hire external workers have an incentive to use the labor of their children. This incentive is stronger as land holdings increase in size because the marginal productivity of labor is itself larger. If households cannot compensate this failure in the labor market by adjusting the land size they operate through sale or rent of land, the positive land-child labor relationship may arise (Bhalotra & Heady, 2003) .
Regarding the supply of child labor, Basu, Das & Dutta (2010) argue that those households who would find it optimal to have their children working a positive amount of time may be demandconstrained if sending their children to work somewhere else is not possible.
1 In this scenario, these households can only employ their children's labor if they have land, and the amount of labor they use can only be high if land holdings are relatively large. In both the demand and supply driven cases, the observed result is that households with more land are more likely to make their children work, and to do so for longer hours.
This work studies the relationship of land wealth with child labor and schooling using data from two separate longitudinal surveys for Colombia and Mexico. In contrast to other studies (Boutin, 2012; Dumas, 2007; Nkamleu & Kielland, 2005; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003) , which observe only cross-sectional data, it develops a fixed effect panel 
II. Conceptual Framework
Numerous studies show that the agricultural sector tends to have imperfect labor and land markets. For example, Shaban, (1987 ), or Foster & Rosenzweig, (1994 show that external labor tends to be inefficient relative to household labor due to the high monitoring costs related to agricultural activities. Arguing that these two types of labor are not perfect substitutes, Jacoby, (1993) presents data on how marginal productivity of household labor in the Peruvian Sierra is significantly higher than market wages.
Discussion on the many causes and evidences found for less than fully flexible land markets can be found in Binswanger, Deininger & Feder, (1995) .
If these two markets are simultaneously incomplete, the total effect on child labor of an increase in the household land holdings is theoretically unclear (Dumas, 2013 ). An increase in land would have two opposite forces affecting the decision to put a child to work: There is an income effect linked to the increase in the net asset position of the household, which tends to reduce child labor (because the household is effectively richer, it can afford to offer less of it).
There is as well a substitution effect, based on the fact that because now the land/labor ratio is higher, the marginal productivity of labor increases; since labor markets are not well functioning, employing family members is preferable to hiring external workers, and therefore the opportunity cost of not employing children from the household rises.
2
The fact that data from various developing countries around the world shows that the relationship between land size and child labor is positive would imply that, for the majority of households in each country, the substitution effect tends to be stronger. Why this effect would be consistently stronger is unclear. One possibility, described by Dwibedi & Marjit, (2015) argues that relative, rather than absolute, income disparities within communities could be the main driver of the decision to put a child to work. The authors hypothesize that if a household's income increases but does so at the same or at a slower rate than that of its peers, the income effect is reduced and thus child labor in the household may not decrease. Basu, Das & Dutta, (2010) argue that when landholdings are sufficiently large, households should be rich enough not to need the use of child labor at all. They explicitly model an imperfect labor market and show that an increase in the land holdings of a household should have a positive effect on the amount of child labor only until a turning point after which the effect starts becoming negative.
The relationship of child labor with land should thus be increasing for relatively small landholdings but decreasing after land size reaches a threshold.
To validate their formulation they use data from a cross-sectional survey for households in northern India, with information on the number of hours worked, and find that the relationship is indeed that of an inverted-U. They estimate that, on average, the turning point after which these households are sufficiently land rich for the income effect to start dominating is around 4 acres of land per household. The fact that this turning point is significantly
higher than the average landholdings in the sample is consistent with the overall negative relationship 2
This kind of trade-off -where the households' income increases simultaneously with the marginal productivity of child laborhas also been studied for a broader set of economic activities: Nardinelli, (1990) finds no relationship in child labor participation rates for nineteenth century Britain even when regional variations in wages were large. Santos, (2013) and Kruger, (2007) study this trade-off with variations in gold and coffee prices respectively. Edmonds & Turk, (2004) The survey makes a distinction between several types of tenancy (formal and informal ownership, possession, occupation, sharecropping, usufruct, etc.). Estimates using alternative definitions of land holdings -such as using only plots with selfreported ownership, or adding plots rented out to other households-are qualitatively the same. agricultural wage labor, or self-employment in other businesses-are not considered as 'working'.
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For both surveys, the sample used corresponds to those children in rural households who were surveyed both at base line and at follow up. Two sources of selection between waves are therefore present: first, attrition may be non-random and households who could not be resurveyed at follow up may be systematically different in one or more characteristics to those who were. Second, households who migrated from rural areas to urban ones between surveys are not considered in estimations and may be themselves systematically different to those who did not migrate. Table A1 in the appendix shows statistics for differences between both groups and the final sample for both surveys.
The table shows that both for ELCA and MxFLS, the attrition and the migrant groups are indeed significantly different from the sample in several observable characteristics, and therefore the external validity of the results shown is disputable.
Estimations should therefore be considered only valid for the specific group of households who did not make the decision to migrate to an urban area, and whom interviewers where able to recontact and resurvey at follow-up. Estimations done including these types of workers do not, however, produce significantly different results.
6
There is substantial variation in the plot land size for both waves of the MxFLS database. 24 land plots in 2002 and 22 land plots in 2005 with sizes equal or above 1000 hectares were not considered in the sample. Standard deviations in parentheses. Data for rural areas only. Data for ELCA survey cover 5 to 9-year-olds in the first survey and 8 to 12-year-olds in the second. Data for MxFLS cover 6 to 12-year-olds in the first survey and 9 to 14-year-olds in the second. or not having land -rather than the amount of land held-and child labor and schooling outcomes.
The second difference is that the age range in
MxFLS surveys is broader than the one in ELCA.
While kids in the Colombian survey are between 5 and 9 years old at baseline, MxFLS children are between 6 and 12. This broader range makes it possible to make estimations on older kids (up to 14) and to divide the cohort into a younger and older subsample and look for any heterogeneous effects dependent on age group.
Because this work estimates a fixed effect model where the main independent variable is the difference in land size within the household, it is important that there is enough variation in this variable between both waves of each survey. 
IV. Econometric Specification
To estimate the relationship between land, child labour supply and schooling attendance, two different sets of regressions are considered. First, three dependent variables -school attendance, labour participation and average weekly work hours-on a single time period are regressed against the independent variable of interest (land area (A)) and a set of individual and household level controls.
Since the relationship between these variables is not expected to be lineal, the squared of land size is also included. The equation estimated is (1), and thus the effect of land on the child labor outcomes is being overestimated.
Under the assumption that these preferences do not change over time, the use of panel data offers an opportunity to assess the omitted vari- The equation for this fixed effects specification is
Where, Dy ihm = (y ihm,t+1 -y ihm,t )
And (t, t+1) are respectively the baseline and follow-up values of each survey. The set of controls Finally, Table 6 shows estimation results for the schooling attendance outcome. Possibly due to the fact that school attendance rates are so high in both countries, coefficients for this outcome are not significant in most of the specifications consid- 
V. Results

A. Heterogeneous Effects
Additional estimations splitting the sample by gender and age group were carried out to evaluate differential effects between these subsamples.
Tables for these estimations are presented in the appendix. Analogous to the main results, heterogeneous effects are found between boys and girls for the ELCA survey both in school attendance and in average working hours. Regarding schooling, the positive relationship between land holdings and school attendance when household fixed effects are included is present mainly for boys, which is an interesting result since it is generally assumed that boys are preferred for agricultural labor over girls, and thus higher land levels should be related to higher rates of school absenteeism for this group. What these estimates show is that, after controlling for household characteristics, positive variations in land levels produce on average a stronger income effect and are thus related to an overall increase in boys' schooling attendance rates. Accordingly, average working hours seem to be positively associated with land on the crosssection estimates for boys only, yet this relationship is no longer observed when household fixed effects are included.
Because the age range in ELCA is relatively small (children at baseline are between 5 and 9), no differential effects are found by splitting the sample into age groups. However, heterogeneous effects for different age groups are found in the what these results show is that there effectively are age related differences in the relationship between land and schooling which can be only analyzed in surveys which include individuals in a relatively broad age range like those in MxFLS.
VI. Conclusion
This work finds that while cross-sectional estima- Table A8 CHILD LABOUR DECISION MODEL Following Santos, (2013) , consider a rural household with one adult and one child with the following utility function.
U = u (c) -an (e)
Where c is consumption, e is the fraction of the child's time spent working, and a is a parameter that measures the relative aversion each household gives to schooling. These functions satisfy that > 0 ; ≤ 0 > 0 ≤ 0
It is assumed there is no labour market 1 . Consumption is thus determined by
c = f(T, e) + I
Where f(T, e) is the child's production function, T is land used by the household and I is an exogenous income provided by the adult, who is always assumed to be working.
Function f(T, e) is assumed to have the standard properties:
A central assumption in the model is a well established fact in agricultural economics (Mueller, 1984) , which shows that an increase in land raises labors' marginal productivity
It is assumed in this model that the relative degree of aversion towards child labor in the family farm simultaneously influences the level of land holdings chosen by the household. The interpretation of this assumption is that households where parents have an overall higher taste for agricultural labor in comparison to employment which requires formal education are both more likely to have a higher level of land holdings and to be less averse to child farm labor. Thus, the level of land chosen by the household is negatively affected by the aversion to child labor the household intrinsically has:
T = g(a) Where, < 0
Finally, the child has one unit of labor which must be divided between school (s) and work The assumption of no market could be relaxed by the inclusion of a parameter that represents the transaction cost of hiring or selling labour (this cost being infinite for the no market case). Including this parameter does not generate any additional conceptual insights (Basu, Das & Dutta, 2010) .
The maximization problem for the household is then to chose the optimal amount of time the child is to spend working:
maxU = u{f(T,e)+ I} -an(e)
Assuming an interior solution to this problem, the first order condition is -an'(e) = u'(c) · f e (T,e) This condition states that, for any level of land (T), the household chooses a level of schooling that satisfies = u'(c). Not surprisingly, since the parameter for schooling preference (a) varies between households, in equilibrium, households with similar levels of land can choose different levels of child labour due to their prior differences in relative preferences for schooling and labour.
Furthermore, by differentiating implicitly the first order condition we get that Since the denominator is always positive, the sign of the derivative will be the sign of (u''(c) · f T · f e + u'(c) · f eT ), which will depend on the degree of concavity of both the utility and the production functions. The net effect on schooling of a change in land used by the household can then be either positive or negative depending on which effect (income or substitution) is stronger. Since f(T, e) = f(g(a),e), both the sign and magnitude of the net effect land has on labor will be partly influenced by the degree of aversion towards child labour.
Two things that this simplified model shows are, first, that the net effect a change in land has on the time distribution of the child is theoretically ambiguous and is thus an empirical matter and, second, that failing to assess the influence parental preferences have may lead to biased results regarding the true effect land has on labor and schooling outcomes. Table A8 CHILD LABOUR DECISION MODEL (e) -an'(e) 
